The Position of the Artificial Intelligence Among the Elements of the Legal Relationship
https://doi.org/10.38044/2686-9136-2020-1-4-74-83
Abstract
The purpose of this work is to determine the place of artificial intelligence among the elements of legal relations, which is seen as necessary for building the model of legal regulation of artificial intelligence.
The research methodology is based on the set of methods of scientific knowledge, including abstract logical, formal legal and the method of correlation analysis.
The article analyzes approaches to determining the place of artificial intelligence in the structure of legal relations. The scientific discussion is that some authors attribute artificial intelligence to the variety of objects of legal regulation; other authors admit that it is possible to consider artificial intelligence as the specific subject of law.
As the result of research, the authors come to the conclusion that today artificial intelligence should be classified as the type of objects of legal regulation.
In conclusion, the work also evaluates the possibilities and measures of the participation of artificial intelligence in legal activities. The authors come to the conclusion that today the cognitive potential of artificial intelligence has not yet reached the level of development that allowed it to repeat the thought processes of the lawyer in resolving the legal dispute. At the same time, artificial intelligence has tremendous potential to become the irreplaceable technological “assistant” for the lawyer, contributing to the improvement of the quality and efficiency of legal services.
About the Authors
Anton A. VasilievRussian Federation
Anton A. Vasiliev — Dr. Sci. in Law, Associate Professor, Head of the Faculty of Law, and Department of Theory and History of State and Law
68, ave. Socialistichesky, Barnaul, Altai Region, 656049
Yulia V. Pechatnova
Russian Federation
Yulia V. Pechatnova — Master’s student
68, ave. Socialistichesky, Barnaul, Altai Region, 656049
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