Preview

Digital Law Journal

Advanced search

Deconstruction of the legal personhood of artificial intelligence

https://doi.org/10.38044/2686-9136-2021-2-2-14-30

Abstract

Calls to rethink the content of “legal personhood” are increasingly being heard at the present time: to recognize animals, artificial intelligence, etc. as a subject. There are several explanations for this: firstly, a change in ideas about a person and their position in society, and secondly, attempts to rethink the traditional categories of law. Throughout long periods of history, the definition of legal personhood depended on the definition of subjective right; the subjective right was associated with the legally significant will of the person. Consequently, a change in views on the will theory of subjective right inevitably lead to a revision of the content of the person. The main purpose of this article is to determine the essence of the legal personhood. To do this, using the historical method, the evolution of ideas about the legal personhood is revealed. It is argued that Hohfeld’s approach to understanding subjective-legal structures made it possible to look differently at the content of the category of legal personhood: it became possible to recognize animals or artificial intelligence as the owners of various subjective-legal categories. Nevertheless, the logic of modern commentators, as well as supporters of such a flexible approach to the definition of legal personhood, is not free from shortcomings. Using the method of analytical jurisprudence, the author demonstrates the emerging problems.

About the Author

S. K. Stepanov
Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO-University)
Russian Federation

Semen K. Stepanov PhD Student, Department of Private International and Civil Law, Junior Research Fellow, Department of Asset Management

76, ave. Vernadsky, Moscow, Russia, 119454



References

1. Artosi, A., Pieri, B., & Sartor, G. (2013). Leibniz: Logico-Philosophical puzzles in the law: Philosophical questions and perplexing cases in the law. Springer. http://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-5192-7

2. Bayern, S. (2015). The implications of modern business — Entity law for the regulation of autonomous systems. Stanford Technology Law Review, 19(1), 93–112. https://law.stanford.edu/publications/the-implications-of-modern-business-entity-law-for-the-regulation-of-autonomous-systems/

3. Bodenheimer, E. (1956). Modern analytical jurisprudence and the limits of its usefulness. University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 104(8), 1080–1086.

4. Brett, A. (1997). Liberty, right and nature: Individual rights in later scholastic thought. Cambridge University Press.

5. Chestnov, I. L. (2009). Sub”ekt prava: Ot klassicheskoj k postklassicheskoj paradigme [Legal person: From classical to postclassical paradigm]. Pravovedenie, 284(3), 22–30.

6. Chestnov, I. L. (2012). Postklassicheskaya teoriya prava [Postclassical theory of law]. Alef-Press.

7. Chopra, S., & White, L. (2011). A legal theory for autonomous artificial agents. University of Michigan Press. http://doi.org/10.3998/mpub.356801

8. Dean, R. (2006). The value of humanity in Kant’s moral theory. Oxford University Press. http://doi.org/10.1093/0199285721.001.0001

9. Dewey, J. (1926). The historic background of corporate legal personality. Yale Law Journal, 35(6), 655–673.

10. Dozhdev, D. V. (Ed., Transl.). (2020). Gai Institutions = Gai Institutionum commentarii quattuor. Statute.

11. Frege, G. (2000). Osnovopolozheniya arifmetiki. Logiko-Matematicheskoe issledovanie o ponyatii chisla [Foundations of arithmetic. Logical and mathematical research on the concept of number]. Vodolej.

12. Gabov, A. V. (2018). Pravosub”ektnost’: Tradicionnaya kategoriya prava v sovremennuyu epohu [Legal personality: A traditional category of law in the modern era]. Vestnik Saratovskoj Gosudarstvennoj Yuridicheskoj Akademii, 121(2), 96–113.

13. Gegel’, G. (2019). Filosofiya prava [Philosophy of law]. Izd-vo Yurajt. https://urait.ru/bcode/411565

14. Gill, C. (1988). Personhood and personality: The four-Personae theory in cicero, De Officiis I. Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 6, 169–199.

15. Grotius, H. (1926). The Jurisprudence of Holland (R.W. Lee, Ed., Transl.). Clarendon Press.

16. Hallevy, G. (2010). The criminal liability of artificial intelligence entities — From science fiction to legal social control. Akron Intellectual Property Journal, 4(2), 171–201.

17. Hart, H. L. A. (1954). Definition and theory in jurisprudence. Law Quarterly Review, 70(1), 37–60.

18. Hart, H. L. A. (1955). Are there any natural rights? The Philosophical Review, 64(2), 175–191.

19. Hart, H. L. A. (1957). Analytical jurisprudence in mid-Twentieth century: A reply to professor Bodenheimer. University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 105, 953–975.

20. Hohfeld, W. (1917). Fundamental legal conceptions as applied in judicial reasoning. Yale Law Journal, 26(8), 710–770.

21. Hvostov, V. M. (2019). Sistema rimskogo prava [Roman law system]. Izdatel’stvo Yurajt. https://urait.ru/bcode/430492

22. Kant, I. (1965). Sochineniya [Works] (Vol. 4). Mysl’.

23. Kozlova, N. V. (2018). Abstraktnoe i konkretnoe ponimanie sub”ekta, pravosposobnosti i grazhdanskogo pravootnosheniya [Abstract and concrete understanding of the subject, legal capacity and civil legal relationship]. In Grazhdanskoe pravo: Sovremennye problemy nauki, zakonodatel’stva, praktiki: Sbornik statej k yubileyu doktora yuridicheskih nauk, professora Evgeniya Alekseevicha Suhanova. Statute.

24. Krakauer, Z. (2014). Ornament massy: [sb. esse] [Mass ornament]. Ad Marginem Press.

25. Kramer, M. (2001a). Getting rights right. In Matthew H. Kramer (Ed.), Rights, wrongs and responsibilities. Palgrave. http://doi.org/10.1057/9780230523630

26. Kramer, M. (2001b). Do animals and dead people have legal rights? Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence, 14(1), 29–54. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0841820900002368

27. Kurki, V. (2019). A theory of personhood. Oxford University Press. http://doi.org/10.1093/ oso/9780198844037.001.0001

28. MacCormick, N. (2007). Institutions of laws: An essay in legal theory. Oxford University Press. http://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198267911.001.0001

29. Muromcev, S.A. (2010). Izbrannye trudy [Selected Works]. Rossijskaya politicheskaya enciklopediya (ROSSPEN).

30. Naffine, N. (2009). Law’s meaning of life: Philosophy, religion, Darwin and the legal person. Hart Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2230.2010.00832.x

31. Ogleznev, V. V., & Surovcev, V. A. (2013). Analiticheskaya filosofiya prava G. Harta i pravovoj realizm [Analytical philosophy of the rights of Hart and legal realism]. Pravovedenie, 309(4), 134–147.

32. Pagallo, U. (2013). The laws of robots. Springer. http://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-6564-1

33. Pietrzykowski, T. (2017). The idea of non-personal subjects of law. In A. J. Kurki, & T. Pietrzykowski (Eds.), Legal Personhood: Animals, Artificial Intelligence and the Unborn (pp. 49–67). Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-53462-6

34. Savin’l, F.K. fon. (2012). Sistema sovremennogo rimskogo prava [The system of modern Roman law] (Vol. 8) (G. Zhigulina, Transl.) (O. Kutateladze, & V. Zubarya, Eds.). Statute. Odessa: Centr issledovaniya prava im. Savin’i.

35. Schlag, P. (1991). The problem of the subject. Texas Law Review, 69, 1627–1743. Schlag, P. (1995). Anti-Intellectualism. Cardozo Law Review, 16, 1111–1120.

36. Selbst, A. D. (2020). Negligence and AI’s human users. Boston University Law Review, 100(4), 1315–1376. http://www.bu.edu/bulawreview/volume-100-number-4-september-2020/

37. Solum, L. (1992). Legal personhood for artificial intelligences. North Carolina Law Review, 70(4), 1231–1287.

38. Steiner, H. (1994). An essay on rights. Blackwell.

39. Sunstein, C. (2004). Can animals sue? In C. R. Sunstein & M. C. Nussbaum (Eds), Animal rights: Current debates and new directions. Oxford University Press. http://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195305104.001.0001

40. Surovcev, V. A. (2012). O metodah analiticheskoj filosofii [On the methods of analytical philosophy]. Analiticheskaya filosofiya: Problemy i perspektivy razvitiya v Rossii. St. Petersburg.

41. Tret’yakov, S. V. (2018). Yuridicheskoe gospodstvo nad ob”ektom kak dogmaticheskaya konstrukciya kontinental’noj civilistiki [Legal domination over the object as a dogmatic design of continental civilistics]. In Grazhdanskoe pravo: sovremennye problemy nauki, zakonodatel’stva, praktiki: Sbornik statej k yubileyu doktora yuridicheskih nauk, professora Evgeniya Alekseevicha Suhanova. Statute.

42. Tret’yakov, S. V. (2020). Sub”ektivnoe chastnoe pravo i «yurisprudenciya ponyatij»: Kul’minaciya i krizis volevoj teorii sub”ektivnogo prava. Vestnik Grazhdanskogo Prava, 20(3), 9–42. https://doi.org/10.24031/1992-2043-2020-20-3-9-42

43. Tur, R. (1988). The “person” in law. In A. Peacocke, & G. Gillett (Eds), Persons and personality: A contemporary inquiry. Basil Blackwell.

44. Vindshajd, B. (1874). Uchebnik pandektnogo prava. T. I. Obshchaya chast’ [Textbook of Pandek law. General Part (Vol. 1)] (S.V. Pahvana, transl.). Izdaniye Giyeroglifa i Nikiforova

45. Vitgenshtejn, L. (2020). Logiko-filosofskij traktat [Logical and philosophical treatise]. Izd-vo AST.

46. Wellman, C. (1995). Real rights. Oxford University Press.

47. Yagodinskij, I. I. (1914). Filosofiya Lejbnica. Process obrazovaniya sistemy. Pervyj period. 1659–1672 [Philosophy Leibnitsa. The process of education system. First period. 1659–1672]. Kazan’


Views: 145


Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.


ISSN 2686-9136 (Online)