<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<!DOCTYPE article PUBLIC "-//NLM//DTD JATS (Z39.96) Journal Publishing DTD v1.3 20210610//EN" "JATS-journalpublishing1-3.dtd">
<article article-type="research-article" dtd-version="1.3" xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xml:lang="en"><front><journal-meta><journal-id journal-id-type="publisher-id">diright</journal-id><journal-title-group><journal-title xml:lang="en">Digital Law Journal</journal-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="ru"><trans-title>Цифровое право</trans-title></trans-title-group></journal-title-group><issn pub-type="epub">2686-9136</issn><publisher><publisher-name>Maxim Inozemtsev</publisher-name></publisher></journal-meta><article-meta><article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.38044/2686-9136-2021-2-2-14-30</article-id><article-id custom-type="elpub" pub-id-type="custom">diright-53</article-id><article-categories><subj-group subj-group-type="heading"><subject>Research Article</subject></subj-group><subj-group subj-group-type="section-heading" xml:lang="en"><subject>ARTICLES</subject></subj-group><subj-group subj-group-type="section-heading" xml:lang="ru"><subject>СТАТЬИ</subject></subj-group></article-categories><title-group><article-title>Deconstruction of the legal personhood of artificial intelligence</article-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="ru"><trans-title>Деконструкция правосубъектности или место искусственного интеллекта в праве</trans-title></trans-title-group></title-group><contrib-group><contrib contrib-type="author" corresp="yes"><name-alternatives><name name-style="eastern" xml:lang="ru"><surname>Степанов</surname><given-names>С. К.</given-names></name><name name-style="western" xml:lang="en"><surname>Stepanov</surname><given-names>S. K.</given-names></name></name-alternatives><bio xml:lang="ru"><p>Аспирант кафедры международного частного и гражданского права им. С.Н. Лебедева, младший научный сотрудник кафедры управления активами </p><p>119454, Россия, Москва, просп. Вернадского, 76</p></bio><bio xml:lang="en"><p>Semen K. Stepanov — PhD Student, Department of Private International and Civil Law, Junior Research Fellow, Department of Asset Management</p><p>76, ave. Vernadsky, Moscow, Russia, 119454</p></bio><email xlink:type="simple">s.stepanov@inno.mgimo.ru</email><xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff-1"/></contrib></contrib-group><aff-alternatives id="aff-1"><aff xml:lang="ru"><institution>Московский государственный институт международных отношений (МГИМО-Университет) МИД России</institution><country>Россия</country></aff><aff xml:lang="en"><institution>Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO-University)</institution><country>Russian Federation</country></aff></aff-alternatives><pub-date pub-type="collection"><year>2021</year></pub-date><pub-date pub-type="epub"><day>17</day><month>07</month><year>2021</year></pub-date><volume>2</volume><issue>2</issue><fpage>14</fpage><lpage>30</lpage><permissions><copyright-statement>Copyright &amp;#x00A9; Stepanov S.K., 2021</copyright-statement><copyright-year>2021</copyright-year><copyright-holder xml:lang="ru">Степанов С.К.</copyright-holder><copyright-holder xml:lang="en">Stepanov S.K.</copyright-holder><license xml:lang="ru" license-type="creative-commons-attribution" xlink:href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/" xlink:type="simple"><license-p>Данная работа распространяется под лицензией Creative Commons Attribution 4.0.</license-p></license><license xml:lang="en" license-type="creative-commons-attribution" xlink:href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/" xlink:type="simple"><license-p>This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.</license-p></license></permissions><self-uri xlink:href="https://www.digitallawjournal.org/jour/article/view/53">https://www.digitallawjournal.org/jour/article/view/53</self-uri><abstract><p>Calls to rethink the content of “legal personhood” are increasingly being heard at the present time: to recognize animals, artificial intelligence, etc. as a subject. There are several explanations for this: firstly, a change in ideas about a person and their position in society, and secondly, attempts to rethink the traditional categories of law. Throughout long periods of history, the definition of legal personhood depended on the definition of subjective right; the subjective right was associated with the legally significant will of the person. Consequently, a change in views on the will theory of subjective right inevitably lead to a revision of the content of the person. The main purpose of this article is to determine the essence of the legal personhood. To do this, using the historical method, the evolution of ideas about the legal personhood is revealed. It is argued that Hohfeld’s approach to understanding subjective-legal structures made it possible to look differently at the content of the category of legal personhood: it became possible to recognize animals or artificial intelligence as the owners of various subjective-legal categories. Nevertheless, the logic of modern commentators, as well as supporters of such a flexible approach to the definition of legal personhood, is not free from shortcomings. Using the method of analytical jurisprudence, the author demonstrates the emerging problems.</p></abstract><trans-abstract xml:lang="ru"><p>В настоящее время в доктрине все чаще слышны призывы переосмыслить содержание категории субъектаправа: признать в качестве субъекта животных, искусственный интеллект и пр. Этому есть несколько объяснений, во-первых, изменение представлений о человеке и его положении в обществе, во-вторых, попытки переосмыслить традиционные категории права. На протяжении долгого исторического этапа определение содержания понятия субъекта права зависело от определения субъективного права, поскольку последнее связывали с юридически значимой волей субъекта. Следовательно, изменение воззрений на понятие субъективного права непременно приводит к пересмотру содержания самого субъекта. Основная цель статьи заключается в том, чтобы определить сущность категории субъекта права. Для этого с помощью исторического метода выявляется эволюция представлений о субъекте права. Утверждается, что подход У. Хофельда к пониманию субъективно-правовых структур позволил иначе взглянуть на содержание категории субъекта права: стало возможным признать в качестве обладателей различных субъективно-правовых категорий животных, искусственный интеллект. Тем не менее логика современных комментаторов У. Хофельда, а также сторонников столь гибкого подхода к определению правосубъектности не свободна от недостатков. Посредством метода аналитической юриспруденции автор демонстрирует возникающие проблемы.</p></trans-abstract><kwd-group xml:lang="ru"><kwd>правосубъектность</kwd><kwd>правоспособность</kwd><kwd>искусственный интеллект</kwd><kwd>У. Хофельд</kwd><kwd>юридические корреляты</kwd><kwd>В. Курки</kwd></kwd-group><kwd-group xml:lang="en"><kwd>legal capacity</kwd><kwd>artificial intelligence</kwd><kwd>legal correlatives</kwd><kwd>Hohfeld</kwd><kwd>legal personhood</kwd><kwd>Kurki</kwd></kwd-group></article-meta></front><back><ref-list><title>References</title><ref id="cit1"><label>1</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Artosi, A., Pieri, B., &amp; Sartor, G. (2013). Leibniz: Logico-Philosophical puzzles in the law: Philosophical questions and perplexing cases in the law. Springer. http://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-5192-7</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Artosi, A., Pieri, B., &amp; Sartor, G. (2013). Leibniz: Logico-Philosophical puzzles in the law: Philosophical questions and perplexing cases in the law. Springer. http://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-5192-7</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit2"><label>2</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Bayern, S. (2015). The implications of modern business — Entity law for the regulation of autonomous systems. Stanford Technology Law Review, 19(1), 93–112. https://law.stanford.edu/publications/the-implications-of-modern-business-entity-law-for-the-regulation-of-autonomous-systems/</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Bayern, S. (2015). The implications of modern business — Entity law for the regulation of autonomous systems. Stanford Technology Law Review, 19(1), 93–112. https://law.stanford.edu/publications/the-implications-of-modern-business-entity-law-for-the-regulation-of-autonomous-systems/</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit3"><label>3</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Bodenheimer, E. (1956). Modern analytical jurisprudence and the limits of its usefulness. University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 104(8), 1080–1086.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Bodenheimer, E. (1956). Modern analytical jurisprudence and the limits of its usefulness. University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 104(8), 1080–1086.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit4"><label>4</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Brett, A. (1997). Liberty, right and nature: Individual rights in later scholastic thought. Cambridge University Press.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Brett, A. (1997). Liberty, right and nature: Individual rights in later scholastic thought. Cambridge University Press.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit5"><label>5</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Chestnov, I. L. (2009). Sub”ekt prava: Ot klassicheskoj k postklassicheskoj paradigme [Legal person: From classical to postclassical paradigm]. Pravovedenie, 284(3), 22–30.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Chestnov, I. L. (2009). Sub”ekt prava: Ot klassicheskoj k postklassicheskoj paradigme [Legal person: From classical to postclassical paradigm]. Pravovedenie, 284(3), 22–30.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit6"><label>6</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Chestnov, I. L. (2012). Postklassicheskaya teoriya prava [Postclassical theory of law]. Alef-Press.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Chestnov, I. L. (2012). Postklassicheskaya teoriya prava [Postclassical theory of law]. Alef-Press.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit7"><label>7</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Chopra, S., &amp; White, L. (2011). A legal theory for autonomous artificial agents. University of Michigan Press. http://doi.org/10.3998/mpub.356801</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Chopra, S., &amp; White, L. (2011). A legal theory for autonomous artificial agents. University of Michigan Press. http://doi.org/10.3998/mpub.356801</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit8"><label>8</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Dean, R. (2006). The value of humanity in Kant’s moral theory. Oxford University Press. http://doi.org/10.1093/0199285721.001.0001</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Dean, R. (2006). The value of humanity in Kant’s moral theory. Oxford University Press. http://doi.org/10.1093/0199285721.001.0001</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit9"><label>9</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Dewey, J. (1926). The historic background of corporate legal personality. Yale Law Journal, 35(6), 655–673.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Dewey, J. (1926). The historic background of corporate legal personality. Yale Law Journal, 35(6), 655–673.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit10"><label>10</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Dozhdev, D. V. (Ed., Transl.). (2020). Gai Institutions = Gai Institutionum commentarii quattuor. Statute.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Dozhdev, D. V. (Ed., Transl.). (2020). Gai Institutions = Gai Institutionum commentarii quattuor. Statute.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit11"><label>11</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Frege, G. (2000). Osnovopolozheniya arifmetiki. Logiko-Matematicheskoe issledovanie o ponyatii chisla [Foundations of arithmetic. Logical and mathematical research on the concept of number]. Vodolej.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Frege, G. (2000). Osnovopolozheniya arifmetiki. Logiko-Matematicheskoe issledovanie o ponyatii chisla [Foundations of arithmetic. Logical and mathematical research on the concept of number]. Vodolej.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit12"><label>12</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Gabov, A. V. (2018). Pravosub”ektnost’: Tradicionnaya kategoriya prava v sovremennuyu epohu [Legal personality: A traditional category of law in the modern era]. Vestnik Saratovskoj Gosudarstvennoj Yuridicheskoj Akademii, 121(2), 96–113.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Gabov, A. V. (2018). Pravosub”ektnost’: Tradicionnaya kategoriya prava v sovremennuyu epohu [Legal personality: A traditional category of law in the modern era]. Vestnik Saratovskoj Gosudarstvennoj Yuridicheskoj Akademii, 121(2), 96–113.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit13"><label>13</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Gegel’, G. (2019). Filosofiya prava [Philosophy of law]. Izd-vo Yurajt. https://urait.ru/bcode/411565</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Gegel’, G. (2019). Filosofiya prava [Philosophy of law]. Izd-vo Yurajt. https://urait.ru/bcode/411565</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit14"><label>14</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Gill, C. (1988). Personhood and personality: The four-Personae theory in cicero, De Officiis I. Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 6, 169–199.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Gill, C. (1988). Personhood and personality: The four-Personae theory in cicero, De Officiis I. Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 6, 169–199.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit15"><label>15</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Grotius, H. (1926). The Jurisprudence of Holland (R.W. Lee, Ed., Transl.). Clarendon Press.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Grotius, H. (1926). The Jurisprudence of Holland (R.W. Lee, Ed., Transl.). Clarendon Press.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit16"><label>16</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Hallevy, G. (2010). The criminal liability of artificial intelligence entities — From science fiction to legal social control. Akron Intellectual Property Journal, 4(2), 171–201.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Hallevy, G. (2010). The criminal liability of artificial intelligence entities — From science fiction to legal social control. Akron Intellectual Property Journal, 4(2), 171–201.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit17"><label>17</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Hart, H. L. A. (1954). Definition and theory in jurisprudence. Law Quarterly Review, 70(1), 37–60.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Hart, H. L. A. (1954). Definition and theory in jurisprudence. Law Quarterly Review, 70(1), 37–60.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit18"><label>18</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Hart, H. L. A. (1955). Are there any natural rights? The Philosophical Review, 64(2), 175–191.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Hart, H. L. A. (1955). Are there any natural rights? The Philosophical Review, 64(2), 175–191.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit19"><label>19</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Hart, H. L. A. (1957). Analytical jurisprudence in mid-Twentieth century: A reply to professor Bodenheimer. University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 105, 953–975.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Hart, H. L. A. (1957). Analytical jurisprudence in mid-Twentieth century: A reply to professor Bodenheimer. University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 105, 953–975.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit20"><label>20</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Hohfeld, W. (1917). Fundamental legal conceptions as applied in judicial reasoning. Yale Law Journal, 26(8), 710–770.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Hohfeld, W. (1917). Fundamental legal conceptions as applied in judicial reasoning. Yale Law Journal, 26(8), 710–770.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit21"><label>21</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Hvostov, V. M. (2019). Sistema rimskogo prava [Roman law system]. Izdatel’stvo Yurajt. https://urait.ru/bcode/430492</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Hvostov, V. M. (2019). Sistema rimskogo prava [Roman law system]. Izdatel’stvo Yurajt. https://urait.ru/bcode/430492</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit22"><label>22</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Kant, I. (1965). Sochineniya [Works] (Vol. 4). Mysl’.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Kant, I. (1965). Sochineniya [Works] (Vol. 4). Mysl’.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit23"><label>23</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Kozlova, N. V. (2018). Abstraktnoe i konkretnoe ponimanie sub”ekta, pravosposobnosti i grazhdanskogo pravootnosheniya [Abstract and concrete understanding of the subject, legal capacity and civil legal relationship]. In Grazhdanskoe pravo: Sovremennye problemy nauki, zakonodatel’stva, praktiki: Sbornik statej k yubileyu doktora yuridicheskih nauk, professora Evgeniya Alekseevicha Suhanova. Statute.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Kozlova, N. V. (2018). Abstraktnoe i konkretnoe ponimanie sub”ekta, pravosposobnosti i grazhdanskogo pravootnosheniya [Abstract and concrete understanding of the subject, legal capacity and civil legal relationship]. In Grazhdanskoe pravo: Sovremennye problemy nauki, zakonodatel’stva, praktiki: Sbornik statej k yubileyu doktora yuridicheskih nauk, professora Evgeniya Alekseevicha Suhanova. Statute.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit24"><label>24</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Krakauer, Z. (2014). Ornament massy: [sb. esse] [Mass ornament]. Ad Marginem Press.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Krakauer, Z. (2014). Ornament massy: [sb. esse] [Mass ornament]. Ad Marginem Press.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit25"><label>25</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Kramer, M. (2001a). Getting rights right. In Matthew H. Kramer (Ed.), Rights, wrongs and responsibilities. Palgrave. http://doi.org/10.1057/9780230523630</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Kramer, M. (2001a). Getting rights right. In Matthew H. Kramer (Ed.), Rights, wrongs and responsibilities. Palgrave. http://doi.org/10.1057/9780230523630</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit26"><label>26</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Kramer, M. (2001b). Do animals and dead people have legal rights? Canadian Journal of Law &amp; Jurisprudence, 14(1), 29–54. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0841820900002368</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Kramer, M. (2001b). Do animals and dead people have legal rights? Canadian Journal of Law &amp; Jurisprudence, 14(1), 29–54. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0841820900002368</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit27"><label>27</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Kurki, V. (2019). A theory of personhood. Oxford University Press. http://doi.org/10.1093/ oso/9780198844037.001.0001</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Kurki, V. (2019). A theory of personhood. Oxford University Press. http://doi.org/10.1093/ oso/9780198844037.001.0001</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit28"><label>28</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">MacCormick, N. (2007). Institutions of laws: An essay in legal theory. Oxford University Press. http://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198267911.001.0001</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">MacCormick, N. (2007). Institutions of laws: An essay in legal theory. Oxford University Press. http://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198267911.001.0001</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit29"><label>29</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Muromcev, S.A. (2010). Izbrannye trudy [Selected Works]. Rossijskaya politicheskaya enciklopediya (ROSSPEN).</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Muromcev, S.A. (2010). Izbrannye trudy [Selected Works]. Rossijskaya politicheskaya enciklopediya (ROSSPEN).</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit30"><label>30</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Naffine, N. (2009). Law’s meaning of life: Philosophy, religion, Darwin and the legal person. Hart Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2230.2010.00832.x</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Naffine, N. (2009). Law’s meaning of life: Philosophy, religion, Darwin and the legal person. Hart Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2230.2010.00832.x</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit31"><label>31</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Ogleznev, V. V., &amp; Surovcev, V. A. (2013). Analiticheskaya filosofiya prava G. Harta i pravovoj realizm [Analytical philosophy of the rights of Hart and legal realism]. Pravovedenie, 309(4), 134–147.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Ogleznev, V. V., &amp; Surovcev, V. A. (2013). Analiticheskaya filosofiya prava G. Harta i pravovoj realizm [Analytical philosophy of the rights of Hart and legal realism]. Pravovedenie, 309(4), 134–147.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit32"><label>32</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Pagallo, U. (2013). The laws of robots. Springer. http://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-6564-1</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Pagallo, U. (2013). The laws of robots. Springer. http://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-6564-1</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit33"><label>33</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Pietrzykowski, T. (2017). The idea of non-personal subjects of law. In A. J. Kurki, &amp; T. Pietrzykowski (Eds.), Legal Personhood: Animals, Artificial Intelligence and the Unborn (pp. 49–67). Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-53462-6</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Pietrzykowski, T. (2017). The idea of non-personal subjects of law. In A. J. Kurki, &amp; T. Pietrzykowski (Eds.), Legal Personhood: Animals, Artificial Intelligence and the Unborn (pp. 49–67). Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-53462-6</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit34"><label>34</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Savin’l, F.K. fon. (2012). Sistema sovremennogo rimskogo prava [The system of modern Roman law] (Vol. 8) (G. Zhigulina, Transl.) (O. Kutateladze, &amp; V. Zubarya, Eds.). Statute. Odessa: Centr issledovaniya prava im. Savin’i.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Savin’l, F.K. fon. (2012). Sistema sovremennogo rimskogo prava [The system of modern Roman law] (Vol. 8) (G. Zhigulina, Transl.) (O. Kutateladze, &amp; V. Zubarya, Eds.). Statute. Odessa: Centr issledovaniya prava im. Savin’i.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit35"><label>35</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Schlag, P. (1991). The problem of the subject. Texas Law Review, 69, 1627–1743. Schlag, P. (1995). Anti-Intellectualism. Cardozo Law Review, 16, 1111–1120.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Schlag, P. (1991). The problem of the subject. Texas Law Review, 69, 1627–1743. Schlag, P. (1995). Anti-Intellectualism. Cardozo Law Review, 16, 1111–1120.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit36"><label>36</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Selbst, A. D. (2020). Negligence and AI’s human users. Boston University Law Review, 100(4), 1315–1376. http://www.bu.edu/bulawreview/volume-100-number-4-september-2020/</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Selbst, A. D. (2020). Negligence and AI’s human users. Boston University Law Review, 100(4), 1315–1376. http://www.bu.edu/bulawreview/volume-100-number-4-september-2020/</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit37"><label>37</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Solum, L. (1992). Legal personhood for artificial intelligences. North Carolina Law Review, 70(4), 1231–1287.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Solum, L. (1992). Legal personhood for artificial intelligences. North Carolina Law Review, 70(4), 1231–1287.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit38"><label>38</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Steiner, H. (1994). An essay on rights. Blackwell.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Steiner, H. (1994). An essay on rights. Blackwell.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit39"><label>39</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Sunstein, C. (2004). Can animals sue? In C. R. Sunstein &amp; M. C. Nussbaum (Eds), Animal rights: Current debates and new directions. Oxford University Press. http://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195305104.001.0001</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Sunstein, C. (2004). Can animals sue? In C. R. Sunstein &amp; M. C. Nussbaum (Eds), Animal rights: Current debates and new directions. Oxford University Press. http://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195305104.001.0001</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit40"><label>40</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Surovcev, V. A. (2012). O metodah analiticheskoj filosofii [On the methods of analytical philosophy]. Analiticheskaya filosofiya: Problemy i perspektivy razvitiya v Rossii. St. Petersburg.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Surovcev, V. A. (2012). O metodah analiticheskoj filosofii [On the methods of analytical philosophy]. Analiticheskaya filosofiya: Problemy i perspektivy razvitiya v Rossii. St. Petersburg.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit41"><label>41</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Tret’yakov, S. V. (2018). Yuridicheskoe gospodstvo nad ob”ektom kak dogmaticheskaya konstrukciya kontinental’noj civilistiki [Legal domination over the object as a dogmatic design of continental civilistics]. In Grazhdanskoe pravo: sovremennye problemy nauki, zakonodatel’stva, praktiki: Sbornik statej k yubileyu doktora yuridicheskih nauk, professora Evgeniya Alekseevicha Suhanova. Statute.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Tret’yakov, S. V. (2018). Yuridicheskoe gospodstvo nad ob”ektom kak dogmaticheskaya konstrukciya kontinental’noj civilistiki [Legal domination over the object as a dogmatic design of continental civilistics]. In Grazhdanskoe pravo: sovremennye problemy nauki, zakonodatel’stva, praktiki: Sbornik statej k yubileyu doktora yuridicheskih nauk, professora Evgeniya Alekseevicha Suhanova. Statute.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit42"><label>42</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Tret’yakov, S. V. (2020). Sub”ektivnoe chastnoe pravo i «yurisprudenciya ponyatij»: Kul’minaciya i krizis volevoj teorii sub”ektivnogo prava. Vestnik Grazhdanskogo Prava, 20(3), 9–42. https://doi.org/10.24031/1992-2043-2020-20-3-9-42</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Tret’yakov, S. V. (2020). Sub”ektivnoe chastnoe pravo i «yurisprudenciya ponyatij»: Kul’minaciya i krizis volevoj teorii sub”ektivnogo prava. Vestnik Grazhdanskogo Prava, 20(3), 9–42. https://doi.org/10.24031/1992-2043-2020-20-3-9-42</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit43"><label>43</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Tur, R. (1988). The “person” in law. In A. Peacocke, &amp; G. Gillett (Eds), Persons and personality: A contemporary inquiry. Basil Blackwell.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Tur, R. (1988). The “person” in law. In A. Peacocke, &amp; G. Gillett (Eds), Persons and personality: A contemporary inquiry. Basil Blackwell.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit44"><label>44</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Vindshajd, B. (1874). Uchebnik pandektnogo prava. T. I. Obshchaya chast’ [Textbook of Pandek law. General Part (Vol. 1)] (S.V. Pahvana, transl.). Izdaniye Giyeroglifa i Nikiforova</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Vindshajd, B. (1874). Uchebnik pandektnogo prava. T. I. Obshchaya chast’ [Textbook of Pandek law. General Part (Vol. 1)] (S.V. Pahvana, transl.). Izdaniye Giyeroglifa i Nikiforova</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit45"><label>45</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Vitgenshtejn, L. (2020). Logiko-filosofskij traktat [Logical and philosophical treatise]. Izd-vo AST.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Vitgenshtejn, L. (2020). Logiko-filosofskij traktat [Logical and philosophical treatise]. Izd-vo AST.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit46"><label>46</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Wellman, C. (1995). Real rights. Oxford University Press.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Wellman, C. (1995). Real rights. Oxford University Press.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit47"><label>47</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Yagodinskij, I. I. (1914). Filosofiya Lejbnica. Process obrazovaniya sistemy. Pervyj period. 1659–1672 [Philosophy Leibnitsa. The process of education system. First period. 1659–1672]. Kazan’</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Yagodinskij, I. I. (1914). Filosofiya Lejbnica. Process obrazovaniya sistemy. Pervyj period. 1659–1672 [Philosophy Leibnitsa. The process of education system. First period. 1659–1672]. Kazan’</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref></ref-list><fn-group><fn fn-type="conflict"><p>The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest present.</p></fn></fn-group></back></article>
