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<article article-type="research-article" dtd-version="1.3" xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xml:lang="en"><front><journal-meta><journal-id journal-id-type="publisher-id">diright</journal-id><journal-title-group><journal-title xml:lang="en">Digital Law Journal</journal-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="ru"><trans-title>Цифровое право</trans-title></trans-title-group></journal-title-group><issn pub-type="epub">2686-9136</issn><publisher><publisher-name>Maxim Inozemtsev</publisher-name></publisher></journal-meta><article-meta><article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.38044/2686-9136-2025-6-2-8-27</article-id><article-id custom-type="elpub" pub-id-type="custom">diright-298</article-id><article-categories><subj-group subj-group-type="heading"><subject>Research Article</subject></subj-group><subj-group subj-group-type="section-heading" xml:lang="en"><subject>ESSAYS</subject></subj-group><subj-group subj-group-type="section-heading" xml:lang="ru"><subject>ЭССЕ</subject></subj-group></article-categories><title-group><article-title>Critical view of the introduction of artificial intelligence in the administrative procedure: Reception of the EU AI Act in Italy</article-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="ru"><trans-title>Критический взгляд на введение искусственного интеллекта в административный процесс в Италии: рецепция европейского Акта об ИИ</trans-title></trans-title-group></title-group><contrib-group><contrib contrib-type="author" corresp="yes"><contrib-id contrib-id-type="orcid">https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9531-0591</contrib-id><name-alternatives><name name-style="eastern" xml:lang="ru"><surname>Ди Сальво</surname><given-names>М.</given-names></name><name name-style="western" xml:lang="en"><surname>Di Salvo</surname><given-names>M.</given-names></name></name-alternatives><bio xml:lang="ru"><p>Ди Сальво М. — доктор права (Неаполитанский университет имени Фридриха II), координатор  исследований</p><p>20123, Милан, ул. Джузеппе Ревере, 16</p></bio><bio xml:lang="en"><p>Michele Di Salvo — Doctor of Law (University Naples Federico II), Research Coordinator</p><p>16, Via Giuseppe Revere, Milano, 20123</p></bio><email xlink:type="simple">mik.disalvo@gmail.com</email><xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff-1"/></contrib></contrib-group><aff-alternatives id="aff-1"><aff xml:lang="ru"><institution>Национальное агентство по искусственному интеллекту</institution><country>Италия</country></aff><aff xml:lang="en"><institution>National Agency for Artificial Intelligence Foundation</institution><country>Italy</country></aff></aff-alternatives><pub-date pub-type="collection"><year>2025</year></pub-date><pub-date pub-type="epub"><day>04</day><month>01</month><year>2026</year></pub-date><volume>6</volume><issue>2</issue><fpage>8</fpage><lpage>27</lpage><permissions><copyright-statement>Copyright &amp;#x00A9; Di Salvo M., 2025</copyright-statement><copyright-year>2025</copyright-year><copyright-holder xml:lang="ru">Ди Сальво М.</copyright-holder><copyright-holder xml:lang="en">Di Salvo M.</copyright-holder><license xml:lang="ru" license-type="creative-commons-attribution" xlink:href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/" xlink:type="simple"><license-p>Данная работа распространяется под лицензией Creative Commons Attribution 4.0.</license-p></license><license xml:lang="en" license-type="creative-commons-attribution" xlink:href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/" xlink:type="simple"><license-p>This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.</license-p></license></permissions><self-uri xlink:href="https://www.digitallawjournal.org/jour/article/view/298">https://www.digitallawjournal.org/jour/article/view/298</self-uri><abstract><p>This article offers a critical examination of Italy’s initial legislative efforts to transpose the European Union’s Artificial Intelligence Act. Employing a methodological approach of argumentative-critical commentary, the analysis dissects the bill’s text to uncover the Italian government’s underlying philosophy and regulatory strategy. The study argues that the proposed framework suffers from a significant lack of overall vision, mistakenly treating AI as a non-penetrating technological tool and reducing its risks primarily to data privacy concerns, all while prioritizing industrial growth. The article critiques key provisions, including the ambiguous “anthropocentric” principle, the superficial regulations governing AI in information, healthcare, intellectual professions, and the judiciary, and the creation of new criminal offences. It further analyzes preliminary projects for integrating AI into administrative justice and explores the profound procedural implications of extending AI into areas of technical discretion, highlighting the potential for a paradigm shift in judicial review. By juxtaposing the Italian approach with a documented case of algorithmic discrimination in the UK, the research underscores the concrete risks to fundamental rights and the rule of law. The conclusion emphatically calls for a more technically competent and critically aware involvement from legal scholars and practitioners to safeguard citizens from the uncritical and pervasive adoption of AI in public administration and justice, warning against the shortcomings of the current fragmented and constitutionally superficial regulatory proposal.</p></abstract><trans-abstract xml:lang="ru"><p>В данном эссе представлен критический анализ первых усилий Италии по транспонированию европейского Регламента об искусственном интеллекте. Автор анализирует текст законопроекта, чтобы выявить лежащую в его основе философию и регуляторную стратегию итальянского правительства. Исследование доказывает, что предлагаемая правовая рамка страдает от значительного недостатка общего видения, ошибочно трактуя ИИ как неинвазивный технологический инструмент и сводя его риски в основном к вопросам защиты данных, одновременно делая приоритетом стимулирование промышленности. В эссе последовательно критикуются ключевые положения законопроекта правительства, включая неопределенный «антропоцентрический» принцип, поверхностное регулирование использования ИИ в сфере информационных технологий, здравоохранения, интеллектуального труда и правосудия, а также закрепление составов новых уголовных преступлений. Далее анализируются проекты по интеграции ИИ в административное судопроизводство и рассматриваются глубокие процессуальные последствия расширения сферы технического усмотрения. Сопоставляя итальянский подход с задокументированным в Великобритании случаем алгоритмической дискриминации, когда ИИ под влиянием больших статистических данных дискриминирует против отдельных категорий людей, исследование выявляет конкретные риски для прав человека и верховенства права. В заключение автор призывает к более компетентному и критически осмысленному участию правоведов и практиков для защиты граждан от необдуманного и повсеместного внедрения ИИ в государственное управление и правосудие.</p></trans-abstract><kwd-group xml:lang="ru"><kwd>административное право</kwd><kwd>конфиденциальность данных</kwd><kwd>искусственный интеллект в правосудии</kwd><kwd>алгоритмическая предвзятость</kwd><kwd>цифровое управление</kwd><kwd>государственное управление</kwd></kwd-group><kwd-group xml:lang="en"><kwd>administrative law</kwd><kwd>data privacy</kwd><kwd>AI in justice</kwd><kwd>algorithmic bias</kwd><kwd>digital governance</kwd><kwd>public administration</kwd></kwd-group></article-meta></front><back><ref-list><title>References</title><ref id="cit1"><label>1</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Dahl, M., Magesh, V., Suzgun, M., &amp; Ho, D. E. (2024). Large legal fictions: Profiling legal hallucinations in large language models. 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